I use new household level data to simultaneously test three competing hypothesis about the primary cause of mortgage default.
between unemployment and negative equity, and modifications are best predicted by past negative equity which makes someone 8% more likely to receive a modification.
Introduction
Using household level data on mortgage delinquency, I compare three competing hypotheses about mortgage default:
• That negative equity is main factor predicting default (Goodman, Ashworth, Landy, and Yin (2010))
• That high credit card utilization is the main factor predicting default (Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010))
• Unemployment is less predictive of default than negative equity or high credit card utilization rates (Goodman, Ashworth, Landy, and Yin (2010) and Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010), respectively)
Contrary to the studies above, I find that the main factor in predicting default is actually an interaction between negative equity and individual unemployment, reaffirming the results in Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) who hypothesize that double trigger events are the most likely cuplrit in predictions default since negative equity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for default. The seminal papers by Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008) and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) started the trend of empirically investigating the role of negative equity in the decision to default. Foote, Gerardi, and Willen use the Massachusetts Registry of Deeds to look at the affect of negative equity on the decision to default. In line with their theoretic model, they find that the majority of people with negative equity do not default. They find that the low default rates by homeowners reflects price expectations and that those who actually did default likely defaulted because of a double trigger event-negative equity and some adverse life event like job loss or health problems. To potentially capture these trigger effects, the authors use a local unemployment indicator as is standard in the literature.
Goodman, Ashworth, Landy, and Yin (2010) try to disentangle the cause of defaultswhether its negative equity or unemployment-by using Loan Performance data and unemployment rates by city. They conclude that negative equity predicts default movements more so than regional unemployment, but they explicitly discuss the limits of using a regional unemployment rate and the bias it induces toward negative equity.
"It is important to realize that we cannot tie the employment status of an individual loan to a particular borrower; we can only tie the unemployment rate of that MSA to a resident borrower. While we use a similar methodology to derive mark-to-market CLTV from original CLTV, the distortion is likely to be less dramatic for CLTVs. That is, if the unemployment rate in a particular area is only 10%, a particular borrower is only 10% likely to be unemployed. However, if homes in a given area have depreciated by 40%, that borrowers house is likely to have dropped a relatively similar amount." (p. 4) There is a considerable amount of work, such as Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008), and Haghwout, Tracy, and Peach (2008), studying the role of origination standards on default decisions; these papers also control for the local unemployment rates, but the studies are based on mortgage data that cannot be linked to employment history. Nonetheless, Haghwout, Tracy, and Peach find that a 1% increase in unemployment increases the likelihood of default by .25%. They find that credit scores account for a .94% increase in defaults. Half the difference is due to changes in the LTVs of new loans, 8 basis points is because of worse DTIs of new loans, FICO scores actually improved for subprime borrows which explains an opposite affect of 17 basis points, the poorly documented underwriting contributed only 16 basis points, and the remaining 43 basis points are explained by other credit factors.
Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) use the Equifax database combined with loan-level mortgage data to predict default. They find that high credit card utilization rates and negative equity are the most important. They control for county unemployment rates, and find that "county-level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk (though less so than high utilization)." To simultaneously address these issues and correct for the lack of an individual unemployment indicator, I use the basic 2007-2009 PSID database along with a matched supplement. I find that the main predictor of default is not negative equity, but rather past mortgage modifications and the interaction between unemployment and negative equity. This is related to a long line of literature on mortgage default that began well before the current recession. Campbell and Dietrich (1983) were among the first to estimate a logit model to predict mortgage default. They noted the difficulties at that time of obtaining matched mortgage and demographic data, but they use regional data on unemployment rates and find that there is a statistically significant relationship between unemployment and default. Foster and Van Order (1985) describe the fact that wealth maximizing households will exercise the option to default whenveer the value of the house plus transactions costs falls below the mortgage amount. "A key point about the model is that personal characteristics of the borrower (income, employment status, etc.) are irrelevant (p.7)." So long as equity exceeds the selling costs, there is no default. Schwartz and Torous (1989) use a hazard rate of prepayment determined by mortgage characteristics to value mortgage securities. Their methodological advances include using the instantaneous hazard rate to predict prepayment for each mortgage, and then integrating over all mortgages within a pool to obtain the value. The resulting equation has too many states to solve by hand so they use Monte Carlo simulation to solve the partial differential equation. Riddiough (1991) is the first to hypothesize that trigger events such as divorce, loss of a job, or accident, influence default behaviour. He used a stochastic jump process to model the trigger event and was successful in replicating actual default behavior in simulations. Vandell (1995) reviews the literature on ruthless default, defined to be a default when the mortgage value exceeds the house value, and considers a various models in which it is possible to "borrow immediately and costlessly from other sources (not equity in the property) to make the required payment if income is disrupted." In the models that were around when this was written, there were no workouts, and foreclosure is instantaneous. Vandell, as the authors above does mention that if the borrower loses his or her job and has negative equity, that default is more likely to occur. Vandell calls for a micro level understanding of the economic realities behind mortgage default. She calls for understanding the role of trigger events. Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996) note that "default is in the money when a borrower's equity is negative, and the prepayment option is in the money when the discounted value of remaining payments is less when discounted at te current interest rather than the mortgage coupon rate." They use lender side data in an option model with trigger events (i.e. some jump process for a bad life event). They use the quarterly unemployment rate and annual divorce rate as proxies for the triggers. Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1997) look at regional unemployment rates in a prepayment model too. They find that regional unemployment rates are important, even after controlling for prices.
Data
The delinquency data is taken from the 2009 PSID Supplement on Housing, Mortgage Distress, and Wealth Data. Table 1 shows the variables used in the empirical portion of the paper and the associated definitions. The main variable of interest is the delinquency variable which is measured as of the interview date. The negative equity variable is constructed based on the reported home value less the reported mortgage principal. The unemployment rate is also taken as of the interview date. The credit card debt, auto loan debt, student loan debt, and any other non-mortgage related debt is lumped into "other debt." I also include basic controls such as age, sex, and marital status, as well as extended controls such as a divorce indicator, change in hospital bills, and changes in hours.
The data is summarized in Table 2 . The majority of the heads of house are male (67%), and there are relatively few households that are 60+ days late (1.5%). This number is unweighted, however. The data are for sample heads only. A relatively large number of households (5%) are reported to have modified their loan at some point. This is quite large considering the related literature on modifications, see Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) and Herkenhoff and Ohanian (2011) for more. 
Basic Results
The first column of Table 3 illustrates the results for the standard regression that has been conducted in the literature. The characteristics of the mortgage are the main dependent variable of interest along with negative equity. The unemployment rate at the state or MSA level. Here, the PSID only allows me to match the households to state unemployment rates. The state unemployment rate, and the change in the state unemployment rate are both negligible, and the regression gives the impression that negative equity is a major factor in determining default. The way to read this regression table is that ceteris paribus, having negative equity makes someone 2.34% more likely to default over a given 2 year time frame.
The second column controls for the change in state unemployment between 2008 and 2009, but the results are unchanged; negative equity is still one of the most important determinants of default.
The third column includes unsecured debt levels. This is similar to the regression performed in Elul, et al. (2010) . The unsecured debt is not a significant predictor of default, if the person has unsecured debt of over $10,000, the person is .42% more likely to default than someone with unsecured debt less than $2,000 dollars.
The fourth column is the same regression as the third, except it includes the state variation in the unemployment rate. Still, the state variation in Unemployment rates is insignificant and certainly less useful in predicting default than negative equity. 
Augmented Basic Results
To make the point clearly, I take the existing structure of the regressions in table 3, and I augment those regressions with individual unemployment rates, and the cross product between the individual unemployment rates and the indicator for negative equity. The first column shows me that the unemployment rate is important in determining default. However, the interaction between unemployment and negative equity is more important:
This means that a person who has negative equity and who is unemployed is 10% more likely to default than a person who has just negative equity. The negative equity alone only makes a person 1.45% more likely to default, a factor of 6 smaller than the interaction probability. Following the literature, I call this result the double trigger result. 
Double Trigger Results
Following up on Table 4 and potentially improve the model fit, I include additional interactions with the important variables not included in the earlier regressions. I control for income and allow income and negative equity to interact; like the other double trigger result, the interaction is significant. The interaction between debt and negative equity is negligible, and insignificant. In fact, the coefficient on Debt 2009 ∈ 2k, 5k is significant and positive indicating that people with debt 2k and 5k are 2.7% less likely to default. 03 Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Redefaults
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that prior modifications are actually the best predictors of defaults, which are defaults after modifications. Those with modifications are 20% more likely to default than those without modifications, ceteris paribus. With this specification, the negative equity term is not significant, but the double trigger coefficient is still positive indicating that those with negative equity who are unemployed are 16% more likely to default than those who are just unemployed or those who just have negative equity. Column 2 of Table 6 restricts the sample to only those who have modified and then asks what the predictors are of redefault-i.e. default after a modification. The most important factor is whether or not they lost their job; if they lost their job they are 28% more likely to redefault on the modification.
Predicting Modifications
To test for multicollinearity in Table 6 , and see if negative equity is redundant, I include a regression that had an indicator of modification as the dependent variable and the 2007 equity status as an independent variables.
2 Clearly, negative equity makes modifications 8% more likely, but unemployment only marginally increases the modification chance by 2%. The "double trigger" term is not significant in this regression indicating that it may be hard for those with negative equity and job loss to get a modification. This is consistent with the Congressional Oversight Panel that found it is practically impossible for unemployed persons to get modifications.
"Among borrowers starting trial modifications, 'curtailment of income' remains the most common reason provided to explain the borrowers' economic hardship: around 47 percent of borrowers gave this reason for their hardship, reflecting in part the effect of underemployment. Unemployment accounts for only around 6 percent. This is not surprising since the program originally was structured in such a way that made it almost impossible for an unemployed borrower to receive help under HAMP without another source of income." (p.20)
The interesting result is that income losses do not predict modifications very well, and neither does an interaction between income loss and modifications. 
Conclusion
I use new household level PSID data to compare three competing hypothesis about the primary cause of mortgage default. I consider the potential interactions of (i) individual unemployment spells, (ii) negative equity, and (iii) unsecured debt. Unlike past studies that were only able to control for regional unemployment rates, I find that the double trigger event of job loss and negative equity is crucial in determining default as has been widely hypothesized in the literature. Surprisingly, unsecured debt relatively unimportant compared to employment status and negative equity. The same holds true for predicting redefaults, which are defaults after modification. I also find that modifications are predicted well by negative equity but not by income, which stand in contrast to government reports about HAMP.
For future work, it is important to have a general equilibrium model that captures these sources of default risk. The macro economic impacts of a stagnant labor market are the likely culprit for the protracted default episodes currently playing out in the United States. I plan to further extend this paper for the Job Market to include a model with directed search in labor and housing driven by liquidity shocks to the housing market.
